


Routing Slip

TO:	ACTION	COORD	INFO
EO/ICS			
D/ICS			
DD/ICS			
DD/RE			
EA-D/ICS			<i>24/12/88</i>
SA-D/ICS			
SA-D/ICS-EP			✓
REO			✓
COMIREX			
SIGINT			
HUMINT			
MASINT			
IPC			
PBO			✓
PPO			✓
CCISCMO			
IHC			✓
RDCO			
LL			
SECRETARIAT			
ADMIN			
REGISTRY			
		- 27/01/88	
		SUSPENSE: _____ Date	
REMARKS:			

STAT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	D/SOVA		X		
18	D/OSWR		X		
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		_____			
		Date			

Remarks DDI will prepare acknowledgment letter for DCI's signature. A briefing for Office of Science and Technology Policy is scheduled next month.


Executive Secretary

24 Oct 88


Date

3637 (10-81)

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508**

OSTP 883073

October 19, 1988



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**SUBJECT: SOVIET TARGETING OF THE NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONAL
SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM**

The National Level National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Program (NLP) has been instituted to ensure NSEP telecommunications for the Federal Government during the late trans- and early post-attack periods of nuclear war in accordance with the guidance of Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions," NSDD-97, "National Security Telecommunications Policy," and NSDD-201, "National Security Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Funding." The NLP actually consists of three individual programs: Nationwide Emergency Telecommunications Service (NETS), Commercial Network Survivability (CNS), and Commercial SATCOM Interconnectivity (CSI).

NETS is a program planned to augment certain capabilities of the Public Switched Networks (PSNs) by providing a survivable and enduring emergency telecommunications service. NETS is planned to augment current PSN call control mechanisms and distribute these functions throughout carrier networks by expanding the limited routing capability of carrier networks so that additional connectivity is available for NSEP traffic. Routing options that do not exist for normal PSN calls are planned, under NETS control, to build usable connections around damaged areas of the network.

The objective of the CNS Program is to optimize the survivability and interoperability of commercial terrestrial telecommunication facilities and services in support of NSEP telecommunication requirements. Improvements to the survivability of selected network switching and transmission facilities would enhance the commercial carriers' ability to maintain connectivity and provide NSEP-related telecommunication services throughout all crisis situations.

The CSI Program (Phase I) is planned to provide a near-term capability to support the PSN in a post-nuclear attack environment. Utilizing surviving commercial satellite resources, CSI is planned to support communications between

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identified switches of the AT&T network. Interconnectivity is being achieved by the implementation of certain modifications to selected, potentially surviving, commercial C-band SATCOM facilities and linking them via terrestrial tail circuits to specific PSN switches supporting government NSEP telecommunications.

A key aspect of the NLP is the installation of equipment or modifications at certain locations to provide the enhancements just described.

I am concerned that this vitally important NLP does what we expect it to do. Its function is absolutely critical, and I want to ensure the program is optimized. To this end, the Office of the Manager, National Communications System (OMNCS) is conducting a sensitivity analysis. I have provided guidance for that analysis which I have attached. All of the work done to date on this analysis has been based on the threat developed before system deployment. One fundamental question remains, however; once actual equipment is installed at the proper locations to provide the required telecommunications during the late trans- and early post-attack periods, and those locations are in fact known, will the Soviets readjust their targeting to account for these "new" C³ targets?

I am personally interested in the answer to this question and believe the OMNCS must know this information to complete its work. This is a matter of national priority. I have asked the OMNCS to coordinate with your organization on this issue of retargeting, and I ask you to assist them with an answer to the retargeting question as soon as possible.


William R. Graham
Director

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Executive Agent, National Communications
System
Manager, National Communications System

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

OSTP 883072

October 19, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE AGENT, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LEVEL PROGRAM SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

The July 25, 1988, memorandum from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to you provided guidance on the National Level Program (NLP) for telecommunications survivability and, among other actions, directed a "performance sensitivity analysis . . . be conducted in coordination with the Office of Science and Technology Policy." While this requirement is technically straightforward, a primary concern is to ensure the integrity and viability of the program and thereby strengthen it against the intense scrutiny it will certainly receive in the next twelve months. An effective and thorough performance sensitivity analysis must not only consider each program individually, but also how each relates to and affects the others. With this in mind, the analysis must consider, at a minimum, the issues identified in the attachment. Additionally, close coordination must be effected with the Director, Central Intelligence, to consider the issue of Soviet retargeting when new system locations are known.

I appreciate the already taxing workload of the NCS and have considered this fact in outlining the requirements for this analysis. I request that you instruct the NCS to provide an interim progress report as soon as possible, preferably in the form of a briefing, before additional effort is expended on the final results due by December 31, 1988.


William R. Graham
Director

Attachment:
Survivability Analysis Factors

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Central Intelligence
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Administrator, General Services Administration
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Assistant Secretary of Defense, C³I
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (MR&P)
Manager, National Communications System
Joint Chiefs of Staff (J6/MCEB)

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